Between the 1890s and early 1900s, the U.S.A., Britain and Canada were engaged in a territorial dispute over the southeastern Alaska border, commonly known as the Alaska boundary dispute. At the time, Canada was a British dominion, so the British government was responsible for negotiating the issue with their American counterpart. With the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 (for $7.2 million), the U.S. had inherited the border dispute which existed between Russia and Britain since 1825. Although the 1825 Saint Petersburg Treaty outlined where the boundary should run, its ambiguous wording led to different interpretations by the parties involved. Ultimately, it was the discovery of gold in the Klondike region in 1896 and the subsequent Klondike Gold Rush (1896-1898) that made the demarcation of the U.S.–Canada boundary imperative.
To settle the issue between the countries, a Joint High Commission was established, with representatives from both sides. Sessions were held during the last months of 1898, but ultimately the negotiations failed. On 20 February 1899, the commission adjourned (never to reconvene again), and in October of that same year the parties agreed to a provisional arrangement.
It wasn't until several years later, in October 1903, that the boundary dispute was finally settled by a six-member tribunal. John Hay, the U.S. Secretary of State, had negotiated the Hay–Herbert Treaty with the British ambassador, Sir Michael Herbert, and the dispute was then entrusted to the newly established Alaska Boundary Tribunal, whose members were three Americans, two Canadians and one Briton. Since the Hay–Herbert Treaty required a commission of "six impartial jurists of repute", the Canadians strongly protested to the British government against the appointed American delegates —all politicians— as being anything but impartial. Nevertheless, Britain accepted the American selection, despite Canadian objections.
The man responsible for selecting the U.S. commissioners was President Theodore Roosevelt, who had inherited the boundary dispute from his predecessor William McKinley, following McKinley's assassination in 1901. Secretary of State Hay disagreed with the member selection but was overruled by the president, who found Hay's attitude cautious and indecisive. Roosevelt was quite eager to settle the case and was determined to act unilaterally should things end in a deadlock. On 25 July 1903, he wrote to Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. — with a clear message to England.
Let me add that I earnestly hope the English understand my purpose. I wish to make one last effort to bring about an agreement through the commission, which will enable the people of both countries to say that the result represents the feeling of the representatives of both countries. But if there is a disagreement, I wish it distinctly understood, not only that there will be no arbitration of the matter, but that in my message to Congress I shall take a position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration hereafter; a position, I am inclined to believe, which will render it necessary for Congress to give me the authority to run the line as we claim it, by our own people, without any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada. If I paid attention to mere abstract right, that is the position I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken it because I wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair settled peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity.
(For the full letter, in which Roosevelt goes into more detail regarding the case and the Canadian claims, go to the link at the bottom of the page.)
I am very much pleased over what has just been accomplished in the Alaska Boundary award. I hesitated sometime before I would consent to a commission to decide the case and I declined absolutely to allow any arbitration of the matter. Finally I made up my mind I would appoint three men of such ability and such firmness that I could be certain there would be no possible outcome disadvantageous to us as a nation; and would trust to the absolute justice of our case, as well as to a straight-out declaration to certain high British officials that I meant business, and that if this commission did not decide the case at issue, I would decline all further negotiations and would have the line run on my own hook. I think that both factors were of importance in bringing about the result. That is, I think that the British Commissioner who voted with our men was entitled to great credit, and I also think that the clear understanding the British Government had as to what would follow a disagreement was very important and probably decisive. Ever your loving father
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